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In this paper, we examine the contract design problem of banks that extend loans to poor 
borrowers and seek to maximize outreach while remaining financially sustainable.  A 
dynamic model is developed that shows how interest rates can be determined based on 
information about productivity and diligence characteristics of borrowers, investment 
opportunities, correlation of business activities, peer monitoring costs, and social 
sanctions.  The results indicate that relative to the traditional static models, the dynamic 
model explains better the current experience in individual and group lending in 
developing countries.  
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A Dynamic Model of Microlending in the Developing Countries 
 
Poor households in developing countries have enjoyed extremely limited access to formal 
financial services.  Greater access, however, would appear to be welfare-improving 
(Morduch).  Potential suppliers of financial services, nevertheless, have historically 
encountered substantial difficulties in overcoming obstacles in this market segment and 
thereby profitably responding to latent demands (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega). 
  Microfinance appears to be a solution to this challenge, where several types of 
microfinance organizations (MFOs), including banks, extend financial services to poor 
households while remaining financially sustainable. The success of microfinance 
programs has been attributed to several innovations in lending technologies (Navajas and 
Gonzalez-Vega).  Most of these innovations have resulted from trial and error processes.  
The expectation is that the most successful innovations will pass the test of time. 
  The most commonly cited innovation is group lending, where members of a 
borrowing group accept joint liability for repayment of a loan.  After group lending was 
shown to work reasonably well in a few places, standardization and replication became a 
priority for many MFOs.  This lending technology became widely adopted by MFOs, 
including well-known organizations such as Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and BancoSol 
in Bolivia (Gonzalez-Vega et al.).  Other MFOs, however, such as the BRI Unit Desa in 
Indonesia, Caja Los Andes in Bolivia, and Financiera Calpia in El Salvador, continued to 
develop individual lending technologies and successfully survived the systemic shocks of 
the turn of the century.  
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  There is still much debate, in any case, about the relative merits of the two 
lending technologies.  In developing countries, dominance of one lending technology 
over the other may depend on particular circumstances, unique to each country and 
region.  Moreover, these innovations may not be sufficient to overcome the existing 
obstacles and, as a result, most banks and other formal financial intermediaries may 
neither reach these clienteles with financial services nor become financially sustainable 
when they attempt it. 
  Addressing these financial market problems would require further development of 
new lending technologies, based on economic models better tailored to the economic 
environment where MFOs operate.  This paper develops models to show how a bank can 
determine optimal interest rates based on information about the productivity and 
diligence characteristics of borrowers, their investment opportunities, degree of 
correlation of their business activities, and levels of peer monitoring.  The bank’s 
objective is to extend loans to a large number of poor households (breadth of outreach), 
especially to the very poor (depth of outreach), while remaining financially sustainable 
(Yaron).
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  An important determinant of bank sustainability is the ability of the bank to 
correctly model borrower characteristics and behavior, in order to secure high repayment 
rates.  While group lending is often associated with high repayment rates, forming groups 
will not always guarantee repayment.  Two other mechanisms ensuring high repayment 
rates are dynamic incentives and regular repayment schedules (Gonzalez-Vega et al.; 
Morduch).  A strong dynamic incentive is the credible threat to cut the borrowers off 
                                                 
1 For an excellent discussion about other dimensions of outreach, see Navajas et al.  
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from any future lending when loans are not repaid.  When borrowers lack access to credit 
from other sources, this mechanism may overcome information and incentive problems in 
both individual and group lending.  Regular repayment schedules reduce monitoring costs 
for the lender (Navajas).  Several papers have attempted to model borrowers’ behavior 
under individual and group lending in an uncertain economic environment.  These static 
models have taken into consideration moral hazard (Conning; Ghatak; Ghatak and 
Guinnane; Navajas), adverse selection (Ghatak and Guinnane; Navajas, Conning, and 
Gonzalez-Vega; Van Tassel), correlated returns of the borrowers’ projects (Armendariz 
de Aghion), and strategic default, where borrowers are able but unwilling to repay their 
loans (Armendariz de Aghion; Ghatak and Guinnane). 
  The basic static model used in this paper was developed by Navajas for the case 
of simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection in individual lending in a static 
framework.  Following Armendariz de Aghion, we extend the basic static model to 
incorporate strategic default, correlated risks, and different group sizes in group lending. 
  A problem with static models is that they attempt to model dynamic interactions, 
such as dynamic incentives and regular repayment schedules, in a static framework.  In 
this paper, we propose a new dynamic model of individual and group lending that 
incorporates moral hazard, adverse selection, strategic default, and correlated risks.  The 
difference between the static and dynamic models here is that, in the dynamic model, 
borrowers take into account the outcomes of their projects and of their peers’ projects 
before they make their decisions about strategic default.  Static models provide useful 
statistics concerning the outcomes of borrower-bank interactions.  Dynamic models are 
needed, however, if one wants to capture the more complex dynamic interactions that  
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underpin repayment behavior.  We believe that static models are only a first step in the 
economist’s attempt to understand strategic lender-borrower interactions.  Despite this 
belief, a substantial fraction of this paper is devoted to static models.  The reason for this 
detailed treatment is that many issues are more clearly and simply observable in the static 
model, while the complicated and computationally intensive treatment of the dynamic 
model is avoided.  Using the static model, furthermore, extensive sensitivity analyses are 
performed for group size, the determinants of strategic default, and the degree of 
correlation of project returns.  Finally, the results from the dynamic and the static models 
are compared and conclusions are drawn. 
 
The Static Model 
Individual liability contracts with moral hazard and adverse selection 
This section describes the basic model developed by Navajas.  Consider an individual 
liability loan contract between a borrower and a bank.  The loan is of size I and the 
principal plus interest due next period is RI.  It is assumed that repayment is an all or 
nothing decision, i.e., the borrower either repays RI or nothing.  The borrower uses the 
loan to invest in a one-period project that yields a random return F(z,I) or, for simplicity, 
zf(I), depending on the borrower’s productivity type z and loan size I.  It is assumed that 
if the borrower’s project is successful, it will yield zf(I), and that if the project fails, it will 
yield zero returns.  Productivity type is assumed to be distributed as a uniform variable 
for the whole population.  Adverse selection may occur if productivity type is not 
observable by the bank.  The production function parameter f is assumed to be constant, 
as different loan sizes are not considered in this paper.  
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  The borrower chooses a level of effort to exert once he takes the loan.  If the 
borrower exerts high effort H, his project will be successful with probability P
H, and if he 
exerts low effort L, his project will be successful with probability P
L.  It is assumed that 
P
H>P
L; i.e., if the borrower exerts high effort, his chances of having a successful project 
are higher than if he exerts low effort. 
  When the borrower exerts low effort, he enjoys additional leisure benefits BI.  
The moral hazard problem arises as the borrower enjoys leisure benefits from exerting 
low effort and passes the costs of doing so to the lender as a lower probability of a 
successful outcome (Conning).  The borrower may also choose not to apply for a loan 
(this choice is indicated as U), if his reservation utility Y is higher than the project returns 
less the loan repayment.  The borrower maximizes his project returns less his repayment 
of the loan under both the high and low effort levels and compares them with his 
reservation utility: 
(1)  { }
,, max , ,
HH LL
HL U P zf P RI P zf P RI BI Y −− +  . 
Given the loan size I and the interest rate r=R-1 offered by the bank, the borrower 
chooses whether to not take the loan U and, if he takes the loan, whether to exert high (H) 
or low (L) effort.   
 
Joint liability contracts 
In the following sections, the basic model for individual lending is extended to examine 
group lending.  A joint liability loan is a contract between a bank and a group of 
borrowers which includes a joint responsibility default clause.  If two borrowers are in a 




H), one of the borrowers will earn positive returns and will be able to 
repay the loan share of the other borrower when the latter earns  zero returns.  Each 
borrower maximizes his project returns less the repayment of his share of the loan and a 
fraction c of the shares of those other borrowers with zero returns.  Given group size of n, 
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Pz f PR I P P c R In
P zf P RI BI P P cRI n Y
−− − −
−+ − − −
 




Consider a joint liability contract when the investment returns are correlated among the 
borrowers.  Following Armendariz de Aghion, let  |
HH
s s P  be the conditional probability that 
the first borrower, who exerts high effort, is successful and has positive returns, given 
that the second borrower, who also exerts high effort, is successful.  Similarly, let  |
HH
s f P  
be the conditional probability that the first borrower, who exerts high effort, is successful 
and has positive returns, given that the second borrower, who also exerts high effort, has 
zero returns.  The probabilities  |
HH
s s P  and  |
HH
s f P  are linked by the following equation: 
(3)  || (1 )
HH H H H H H
ss sf P PP P P +− = . 
Then,  ||
HH HH H
ss sf P PP ==  corresponds to the case where the borrowers’ returns are not 
correlated and  ||
HH H HH
s ss f P PP >>  corresponds to the case where the borrowers’ returns are 
positively correlated.  
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  The borrower’s problem is modified to reflect the possibility of correlated returns 




max (1 ) ( 1),
         (1 ) ( 1) ,
HH H H H H H
HL U
LL L L L L L
Pz f PP R I P P c R In
P zf P P RI P P cRI n BI Y
−− − −
−− − − +
. 
For convenience, the subscript s|s is dropped from  |
HH
s s P  for the rest of the paper. 
 
Strategic default 
Previous sections of this paper discussed the case in which a borrower is unable to repay 
his loan due to project failure and zero returns.  Let us now suppose that the borrower is 
successful and can repay his loan but is unwilling to do so.  A borrower has two choices: 
(a) he may repay his share of the loan and the share of the other borrowers who are 
unable or unwilling to repay their share, or (b) he may default, keep the returns from his 
project, and forfeit future access to credit. In order to gain future access to credit, the 
borrower needs to repay not only his share but also the shares of all other borrowers who 
do not repay. 
  The value that the borrower derives from being able to re-access future financing 
is denoted by V.  This value is lost if the borrower does not repay his loan and the loans 
of the other defaulting members in the group. In the static model, the value V is assumed 
to be exogenous..  It is also assumed that the borrowers decide whether to repay or to 
strategically default before they realize whether their projects are successful. 
  Joint liability contracts are used to transfer screening and monitoring costs from 
the bank to the borrowers.  Peer monitoring helps to deter strategic default if a borrower 
who strategically defaults is subject to social sanctions.  Following Armendariz de  
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Aghion, let W denote the (private) cost that social sanctions impose upon a borrower who 
strategically defaults and let γ  denote the probability that a borrower is monitored by 






max 1 ( 1) ,
         1 (1 )
HH H H HH H H
ND
HH n H H H
P zf P P RI P P cRI n P V
Pz f P W PP V γ
−
−− − − +
 −− − + 
. 
The borrower can choose to not default (N), to repay his share and the share of the other 
defaulting members and gain the value of re-accessing future credit, or to strategically 
default (D) and keep his project returns, but incur social sanctions, and gain the value of 
re-accessing future credit only if another group member repays his share of the loan.  
Note that the probability of being monitored 
1 () 1 ( 1 )
n n γ
− =− − Γ  and, therefore, the 
decision of strategic default depend on group size n. 
 
A comprehensive static model 
The model developed in this section is a comprehensive model that includes all of the 
dimensions discussed in previous sections.  The borrower has five choices: (1) take the 
loan, exert high effort, and, if he is successful, repay his share and the share of other 
defaulting members, (2) take the loan, exert high effort, and strategically default, if he is 
successful, (3) take the loan, exert low effort, and if he is successful, repay his share and 
the share of other defaulting members, (4) take the loan, exert low effort, and 
strategically default, if he is successful, and (5) not apply for the loan. 




,,,, max (1 ) ( 1) , 
                     ,
                     (1 ) ( 1) ,
                     ,
                
HH H H H H H H
HN HD LN ND U
HH H H H
LL L L L L L L
LL L L L
P zf P P RI P P cRI n P V
Pz f P W PP V
P zf P P RI BI P P cRI n P V
Pz f P W PPV
−− − − +
−+




}    Y
 
This model incorporates the adverse selection problem arising from the fact that 
productivity type z is not observable by the bank.  It also incorporates the moral hazard 
problem through the borrower’s choice of either a high and low effort level and the 
resulting probabilities of success (P
H and P
L).  The model applies to individual liability 
contracts, when c=0, and to joint liability contracts, when c>0.  The question of how 
group size n affects decisions can also be addressed.  The model can be applied to the 
agricultural sector, where usually returns are positively correlated ( |
HH
s s P >P
H > |
HH
s f P ) and 
to other sectors where returns are independent among borrowers ( |
HH
s s P = |
HH
s f P =P
H).  
Finally, the model incorporates the decision of strategic default when social sanctions W 
are imposed on a borrower who, with probability Γ Γ Γ Γ , is monitored by at least one of his 
peers. 
 
Individual and joint liability contracts offered simultaneously  
Suppose that the bank chooses to offer both individual and joint liability contracts with 
interest rates r
i=R
i-1 for the individual liability contract and r
j=R
j-1 for the joint liability 
contract.  The borrower’s choices increase to nine: high or low effort level, default or not 
default for both individual and joint liability contracts (a combination of eight choices), 
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                      ,
                      ,
                      (1 )
HH i H
HNi HDi LNi NDi
HNj HDj LNj NDj U HH
LL i L
LL
H H HH j H HH
Pz f PR I PV
Pz f P W
Pz f PR I B I PV
Pz f P W










                      ,
                      (1 ) ( 1) ,
                      ,
                    Y
jH
HH H H H
L L LL j L LL j L
LL L L L
I nP V
Pz f P W PP V
P zf P P R I BI P P cR I n P V
Pz f P W PPV
−+
−+







The bank and the borrowers engage in the following sequential game (Ghatak).  First, the 
bank offers an individual or a joint liability contract, specifying loan size I, interest rate 
r=R-1, and level of joint liability c.  For simplification, c=0 or c=1, although the model 
can be easily extended for other degrees of joint liability.  The bank can offer an 
individual liability contract, a joint liability contract, or both.  Second, the borrowers 
decide whether to take the loan and, if they do, they make their choices regarding their 
level of effort and possible strategic default.  Finally, the projects are carried out and 
outcome-contingent transfers as specified in the contracts are met. 
  This paper assumes that the bank’s objective is to choose an interest rate that 
maximizes the borrowers’ residual returns (project returns minus loan repayments), 
subject to the constraint that the bank’s expected profit per loan is zero (Navajas; 
Conning; Ghatak; Ghatak and Guinnane).  The maximization problem considered here 
extends Navajas’ model of adverse selection and moral hazard in individual lending to 
incorporate correlated returns and strategic default in group lending.  
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  Borrowers of different productivity type z choose whether to participate in the 
loan market and, if the loan is taken, they select different levels of effort and decide 
whether to strategically default.  Let P
k be the probabilities of loans being repaid 
corresponding to the choices that borrowers of type z make, where 
(8)
 if the borrower exerts high effort and does not default
 if the borrower exerts low effort and does not default






PP P = im
 if the borrower exerts low effort and defaults but his partner repays for him












  Suppose that productivity type z in the population is uniformly distributed on the 
interval zero to one, with a distribution function G(z)=uniform[0,1].
2  The optimization 
problem determines the choices that borrowers of different type z make regarding taking 
loans, exerting high or low effort, and defaulting strategically.  Let z
k  be the breakpoints 
at which borrowers of different type change their choices.  If a borrower of type z 
chooses not to take a loan, then G(z)=0.  The number of borrowers β  as a proportion of 








borrowers G z G z β
−
=
 =− ≡    
where 0≤ β ≤ 1.   
                                                 
2 Navajas;  Navajas, Conning, and Gonzalez-Vega claim that productivity type is distributed as a standard 
normal variable (this is equivalent to assuming that project returns are zero on average).  Since we assume 
that project returns are non-negative and, on average positive, a uniform distribution of this variable is 
more appropriate.  
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  For each choice of participation, level of effort, and strategic default, there is a 
corresponding probability of repaying the loan P
k and a proportion of borrowers 
k β  







≡  ).  Assuming that there are no partial loan 
collections and that group members receive loans of equal size, the default rate for the 
bank is calculated as the probability that a borrower will be unwilling or unable to repay 
his loan (1-P
k), weighted by the proportion of borrowers 


















  The bank obtains outside funding with interest rate ρ  and has total handling costs 
m, which are diluted among all borrowers.  This is the number of borrowers as a 
proportion of the population β  times the number of agents in the population b.  The bank 
sets the lowest interest rate such that its operations are financially sustainable, i.e., the 
bank’s expected profit per loan is zero: 
(11) 











= −+ − =

. 
This equation represents bank profits as repayments on the loans minus the interest rate 
paid on bank funds and the average (per borrower) handling costs that the bank incurs.  
The first term is the repayments (RI) received from the borrowers, weighted by their 
probability of success for the corresponding level of effort and by their default decision, 
added over the number of borrowers having made the same choice, as a proportion of the 
total number of borrowers.  The second term is the bank’s cost of obtaining outside  
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financing, at interest rate  ρ .  The third term is the total handling costs for the bank 
divided by the number of borrowers. The bank chooses an interest rate  1 rR =−  such that 
its profits are zero.  The zero profit condition can be generalized to the case in which the 








In the static model, the value that a borrower derives from being able to re-access future 
credit was assumed to be exogenous.  It was also assumed that the borrower decides 
whether to repay or strategically default before he observes whether he has been 
successful.  In this section, we develop a dynamic model, where the value of re-accessing 
future credit is assumed to be endogenous and where the borrower decides whether to 
repay or to strategically default after he observes whether his project has been successful.  




In the first stage, the borrowers are either in (never defaulted on a loan before) or out 
(defaulted on a loan before).  They choose whether to not take the loan U, take the loan 
and exert low effort LL, or take the loan and exert high effort HH.  The first index refers 
to the first borrower and the second index refers to the second borrower.  Only the 
symmetric cases of HH (high effort and high effort) or LL (low effort and low effort) are 
                                                 
3 Rodriguez-Meza also discusses a case of strategic default in a dynamic setting.  His model and 
implications, however, are different from the model and implications in this paper. 
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considered; otherwise, each borrower has an incentive to choose a low level of effort for 
himself and a high level of effort for the other borrower.  States, actions, and transition 
probabilities are defined as follows: 
  state   
   - never defaulted on a loan before








   - do not get a loan, get a reservation utility
   - get a loan and exert low effort










  transition probabilities  
( )  probability of  if 
( )  probability of  if 
( )  probability of  if 
( )  probability of  if 
( )  probability of  if 









P ss ss HH
P sf sf HH
P fs fs HH
P ff ff HH
P ss ss LL
P fs sf LL
Ps f  probability of  if 
( )  probability of  if 
1 probability of  if 
0             probability of  if 
LL
fs LL
P ff ff LL





















HH(ss) is the joint probability of the state ss (both the first and the 
second borrowers are successful) in the second stage, given that HH (both the first and 
the second borrowers exert high effort) were chosen as actions in the first stage.  The 
same logic applies to the other probabilities.  Given that the borrower is out this period, 





In the second stage, the borrowers observe the outcomes of their projects (success or 
failure) and then decide whether to default.  If at least one of the borrowers decides not to 
default and repay the loan, then the probability of them being in next period is 1.  If both 
borrowers decide to default, then the probability of them being in state out next period is  
  state   
   - success and success
   - success and failure
   - failure and success
















   if 
NN, ND, DN, DD   ss
ND, DD   sf









 transition  probabilities 
1   probability of  if 
1   probability of  if 









Here N is not default, and D is default.  Again, the first index refers to the state or action 
of the first borrower and the second index refers to the state or action of the second 
borrower.  Note that some actions are not applicable in some states.  If the state is f 
(failure), the only possible action is D (default).  Therefore, there are 16 possible 
combinations of actions, contingent on the states occurred. 
 
Bellman’s equation for stage 1 
The value of being in state in is the maximum value of either taking the reservation utility 
and staying out of the loan market this period, or taking a loan, choosing a high or low 
effort level, and receiving the value of being in different states in stage 2 (ss, sf, fs, ff).    
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(12)
() () () () {
() () () ()
}
,, () m a x () () () ( ) ,
                        ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),
                      
HH HH HH HH
UL LH H
LL LL LL LL
V in P ss V ss P sf V sf P fs V fs P ff V ff
Ps s V s sPs f V s fPf s V f sPf f V f f
Y+ V ( i n ) δ
=+ + +
+++  
The value of being in state out is the reservation utility and remaining in state out next 
period. 
(13)  () () V out Y V out δ =+  
 
Bellman’s equation for stage 2 
A Bellman’s equation captures the borrower’s problem of balancing the immediate 
reward of defaulting against future rewards of being able to re-access the loan market.  
V(ss) is the maximum attainable sum of current and expected future rewards, given that 
the borrowers are currently in the state success and success.  If the borrowers are in state 
ss (success and success), they have four choices: both of them repay their shares, one of 
them repays both loans when the other strategically defaults, or both of them default and 
are removed from the loan market.  The same logic applies for the other states.  The rest 




,,, ( ) max ( ), (1 ) ( ),
                                ( ), ( )
NN ND DN DD V s s z f R IV i n z f Rc IV i n
zf W V in zf W V out
δδ
γδ γδ
=− + − + +
−+ −+
 
(15)  { }
, ()m a x ( 1 ) () , ( )
ND DD Vs f z f R cI Vi n z f W Vo u t δγ δ =− + + − + , 
(16)  { }
, () m a x () , ( )
DN DD Vf s V i n Vo u t δδ = , and 
(17)  () ( ) V ff V out δ = .  
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Note that in the dynamic model, the choice of whether to default depends on the success 
or failure of the borrowers, whereas, in the static model, the choice to default or not is 
made prior to the realization of the success or failure state. 
  Equations (14), (15), (16), and (17) are substituted into equation (12), so that 
V(in) is a function of only V(in) and V(out).  Equations (12) and (13) are functional 
equations for V(in) and V(out) and can be solved using a dynamic programming 
approach.  Given a loan of size I, an interest rate r=R-1 offered by the bank, and a level 
of joint liability c, the borrowers choose whether to take the loan, exert high or low effort, 
and whether to default based on the current state of being in or out in stage 1 and success 
or failure in stage 2. 
 
Bank profits 
The analysis of bank profits in the dynamic model is the same as in the static model, 
except for the probabilities associated with different choices.  Let P
k be the probability 






k(ff). That is, 
 
(18)
(  if the borrowers exert high effort and at least one does not default
( ) (  if the borrowers exert low effort and at least one does not default












where xx is ss, sf, fs, or ff.  The rest of the analysis is the same as in the static model. 
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Solving the Models 
The static and dynamic models described above are solved using a three-step procedure 
(Ghatak).  First, the bank offers a loan contract of size I with interest rate r=R-1 and a 
level of joint liability c=0 or c=1.  The bank can offer an individual liability contract, a 
joint liability contract, or both.  Second, the borrowers select different contracts and 
decide what level of effort to exert and whether to default o not.  Third, the bank takes 
into consideration the choices of the borrowers and calculates profits.  The bank sets the 
interest rate, the joint liability level, and whether it offers one or both contracts, such that 
its operations are financially sustainable. 
  Table 1 shows the parameters used in the static and the dynamic models.  The 
parameters corresponding to the static model with moral hazard and adverse selection for 
individual lending are from Navajas, with some modifications to fit our model.  The rest 
of the parameters are set using economic intuition.  Sensitivity analyses and robustness 
checks are performed for different values of the parameters.  The parameters are the same 
for both the static and the dynamic models, with the exception of group size and the value 
of re-accessing future credit.  The value of re-accessing future credit is assumed to be 
exogenous in the static model and endogenous in the dynamic model.  In the dynamic 
model, group size is either 1 (individual liability) or 2 (joint liability).  Building a 




Static Model Results 
The static optimization model is solved using the Matlab software.  The next section 
presents the basic results and the following sections perform sensitivity analyses on the 
parameters used in the model. 
 
Individual and joint liability contracts 
Suppose that the bank offers either an individual liability contract or a joint liability 
contract but not both contracts.  Table 2 shows the interest rate required for bank 
sustainability, the number of borrowers reached, the default rates, the borrowers’ 
decisions of participating in the credit market, and their choices of effort levels. 
  Given these parameters, if bank operations are to be sustainable, the bank must 
charge interest rates of 61 percent on the individual liability contracts, 37 percent on the 
joint liability contracts with independent returns, and 54 percent on the joint liability 
contracts with correlated returns.  Thus, the interest rate required for bank sustainability 
is lower for group lending than for individual lending.  The bank can offer lower interest 
rates on joint liability contracts because those borrowers with failed projects may use 
other members of the group to repay their loan shares, an option not available under 
individual liability contracts.  That is, there is risk sharing between the bank and repaying 
group members. 
  The crucial assumptions for this result are that group lending does not destroy the 
borrowers’ incentives, by leading to low effort levels (moral hazard) and/or to a desire to 
free ride on other group members either in monitoring their peers or for loan repayment 
(strategic default).  Ghatak formally shows that the interest rate under group lending will  
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always be lower than the interest rate under individual lending in the absence of moral 
hazard and strategic default.  This may no longer be the case if these assumptions are 
abandoned. 
  The results for group lending with correlated returns will always be between the 
results for the two extreme cases: group lending with independent returns and individual 
lending, which can be thought of as group lending with perfectly correlated returns.  The 
interest rate that the bank must charge in group lending where returns among borrowers 
are independent is lower than in group lending where returns are correlated.  The bank 
can offer lower interest rates when returns are independent because, when a borrower’s 
project fails, the chance that another borrower’s project will fail is lower for independent 
than for positively correlated project returns. The finding that the interest rate in group 
lending may be lower than in individual lending does not necessarily mean that all 
borrowers will be better off under group lending (Ghatak).  When making decisions about 
taking loans, borrowers not only consider differences in repayment costs associated with 
interest rates.  In contrast to individual credit, in group lending borrowers must also 
balance the benefit of having someone else repay their loan share (the benefit of being 
partially insured against default) and the cost that they may incur to repay the loan shares 
of other borrowers in case of their inability or unwillingness to repay loans (the cost of 
insuring other members against default).  They will also incur peer monitoring costs 
inexistent in individual loans. 
  In fact, under the parameters of the model, for low productivity borrowers with 
low project returns, the cost of insuring others is higher than the benefit of being insured 
plus the benefit of paying a lower interest rate.  These agents will choose not to take joint  
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liability loans, even if they would have taken individual liability loans at higher interest 
rates. 
  Both the breadth and depth of outreach are lower in group lending, since the 
lowest productivity borrowers willing to participate in individual lending will not to take 
group loans.  The number of borrowers reached by the bank is highest in the case of 
individual lending (90 percent of the population), lower for group lending with correlated 
returns (87 percent), and lowest for group lending with independent returns (80 percent).  
Equivalently, 10 percent (3 percent) of the population, precisely the lowest productivity 
borrowers who would take individual loans will not take group loans when their returns 
are independent (correlated).  This result seems to contradict the usual observation that 
poorer borrowers take group rather than individual loans.  The reason may be that 
individual lenders require some form of non-traditional collateral beyond the expectation 
of a future loan. The cost of insuring others against default versus the benefits of being 
insured against default also influences the default rates for the bank.  The default rates for 
the bank are 28 percent for the individual liability contracts, 25 percent for the joint 
liability contracts with correlated returns, and 15 percent for the joint liability contracts 
with independent returns.  Group lending has a positive effect on repayment rates, 
resulting from the possibility that a successful borrower may repay the loan of a 
defaulting partner.  There is also a potential negative effect, which arises if the entire 
group defaults, when at least some members would have repaid if they were not burdened 
with the liability of other members (Besley and Coate).  For group lending with two 
borrowers, as long as moral hazard is not increased by group lending, the positive effect 
dominates the negative effect, and repayment rates are higher for group compared to  
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individual lending.  This may not be the case when joint liability influences the 
possibility of strategic default. 
  The borrowers self-select into the following groups: non-applicants, for agents 
with low levels of productivity; borrowers who exert low effort and do not default, for 
agents with medium levels of productivity; and borrowers who exert high effort and do 
not default, for agents with high levels of productivity.  This is a standard incentive 
compatibility result, due to the assumption of different productivity types.  Low 
productivity agents prefer to enjoy their reservation utility, medium productivity agents 
prefer to borrow but exert low effort and enjoy leisure benefits, and high productivity 
agents prefer to take a loan and exert high effort, because their returns are most sensitive 
to an increase in effort.  Generally, the results found in Navajas and here, regarding the 
borrowers’ choices of participation and exerted effort, for the case of individual lending 
also extend to group lending. 
  Group lending may not only attract more productive borrowers than individual 
lending but, in small groups, it may also reduce moral hazard, due to increased 
monitoring.  The proportion of the population that takes loans and exerts low effort is 55 
percent in individual lending, 43 percent in group lending with correlated returns, and 14 
percent in group lending with independent returns.  As shown below, this result does not 
hold in large groups. 
 
Sensitivity analysis on strategic default 
The main reason for the success of group lending is often attributed to peer monitoring. 
Compared to the bank, borrowers have a comparative advantage in monitoring their peers  
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and enjoy a superior enforcement technology, as they can impose social sanctions to 
peers who strategically default.  If a borrower is caught in strategically defaulting, he will 
incur social sanctions W with a probability Γ Γ Γ Γ  that he is being monitored.  
  If the social sanctions for default and/or the monitoring probability are low, then 
the borrower will strategically default.  For example, if the social sanctions decrease from 
$200 (as was assumed in the previous section) to $100 or, equivalently, if the monitoring 
probability decreases in half, all group members will default and the bank’s operations 
will not be sustainable at any interest rate.  Therefore, bank group lending operations can 
only be sustainable in communities with high social sanctions and high probabilities of 
peer monitoring (low transaction costs of monitoring).  Moreover, if the social sanctions 
are sufficiently severe, group lending will yield higher repayment rates than individual 
lending (Beasley and Coate). 
 
Sensitivity analysis on correlated returns and moral hazard 
When strategic default is prevented by high social sanctions, individual lending can be 
considered as group lending with perfectly correlated returns.  Therefore, as the 
correlation of borrower returns increases from zero to one, the results trace all values 
between the two extreme cases of group lending with independent returns and individual 
lending.   
  Since it was found here that lower interest rates are required to ensure 
sustainability in group lending than in individual lending, an increase in the degree of 
correlation in the borrowers’ project returns, as is typically the case in agriculture, will 
lead to higher interest rates being charged.  The ambiguity found in the literature on this  
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issue is not found here.  In general, the degree of positive correlation has an ambiguous 
effect on the interest rates charged by the bank (Armendariz de Aghion).  On the one 
hand, an increase in correlation increases the borrower’s incentive to invest in monitoring 
efforts, since a borrower will often try to avoid having to repay the debt of his peer.  On 
the other hand, a higher correlation will increase the borrower’s incentive to strategically 
default, for a given monitoring probability, and instead rely on his peers to repay his debt. 
  An increase in the probability of success of the project, when the borrower exerts 
high effort, tends to encourage diligence and this, in turn, leads to lower interest rates and 
lower default rates and to increased bank outreach.  For example, if the probability of 
success P
H increases from 0.9 to 1, the interest rate declines to 29 percent (16 percent), 
the default rate declines to 11 percent (zero percent), and the number of borrowers 
increases to 100 percent (95 percent) for individual lending (group lending). 
  If the probability of success of the project, when a borrower exerts low effort, 
increases, it becomes more beneficial for borrowers to exert low effort, because of the 
leisure benefits that they obtain.  In general, the effect on interest rates and on default 
rates of an increase in P
L is ambiguous.  The higher probability of success reduces default 
rates for borrowers exerting low effort, but more borrowers will shift from exerting high 
effort to exerting low effort. 
 
Sensitivity analysis on group size 
Armendariz de Aghion shows that, when group size increases, there are four effects that 
influence the decision of strategic default for the members of the group.  A free-riding 
effect discourages individual monitoring efforts in a larger group, due to the increased  
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probability that at least one borrower will be successful and able to repay for defaulting 
members.  A joint-responsibility effect encourages more intense monitoring, since 
monitoring will not only reduce the possibility of having to repay for a peer but will also 
force that peer to repay for other defaulting borrowers.  A cost-sharing effect increases 
monitoring, since the cost of monitoring another borrower declines in larger groups, 
given that monitoring is shared among an increasing number of peers.  Finally, a 
commitment effect encourages peer monitoring, because each borrower becomes more 
fearful about strategic default by peers, since he has to repay for a larger number of 
defaulting borrowers. 
  As table 3 shows, a larger group size initially increases monitoring and risk 
sharing within the group. As this prevents defaults and reduces moral hazard (the choice 
of low level of effort), the bank offers a lower interest rate.  The bank is able to charge 
the lowest interest rate, of 30 percent, for group size of three borrowers with independent 
returns and for group size of seven borrowers with correlated returns. 
  As group size increases even further, however, the free-riding effect starts to 
dominate and the bank has to charge increasingly higher interest rates.  For a group of six 
borrowers with independent returns and a group of 11 borrowers with correlated returns, 
the free-riding effect becomes so adverse that all borrowers default and the bank’s 
operations are not sustainable.  Therefore, the relative benefits from monitoring and risk 
sharing are maximized when group size is neither too small, due to a joint-responsibility, 
cost-sharing, and commitment effects, nor too large, due to a free-riding effect 
(Armendariz de Aghion). 
  
 26
Individual and joint liability contracts offered simultaneously 
The results regarding the sustainability and outreach of the bank are valid only if the bank 
offers either individual or joint liability contracts but not both of them simultaneously.  If 
the bank (or two banks competing for the same clients) offers both individual and joint 
liability contracts at the same time, the borrowers may choose the type of contract. 
  Suppose that the bank offers both individual and joint liability contracts, at the 
interest rates required for sustainability for each type of contract, if they were offered 
separately.  The borrowers decide whether to take the loan and, if they take the loan, they 
self-select into one of the two contract types and make their choices regarding the effort 
to be exerted and the default decision.  Given the decisions that the borrowers make, the 
bank recalculates its profits. 
  If the borrowers are given a choice between individual liability contracts and joint 
liability contracts, with group size smaller than four (nine) borrowers for the case of 
independent (correlated) returns, the bank operations are no longer sustainable.  The 
reason is that, on the one hand, for high productivity borrowers, the benefit of being 
insured against default is greater than the cost of insuring peers against default, causing 
them to choose the joint liability contracts.  On the other hand, for the low productivity 
borrowers, however, the cost of insuring others against default is greater than the benefit 
of being insured against default, and therefore they choose the individual liability 
contracts.  The bank operations cannot be sustainable for reasons similar to the lemon’s 
market argument – the high productivity potential borrowers no longer choose the 
individual liability contracts, so that the interest rate no longer reflects the underlying risk 
profiles of the borrowers.  
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  In contrast, if the borrowers are given a choice between individual liability 
contracts and joint liability contracts with group size larger than four (nine) borrowers for 
the case of independent (correlated) returns, the bank operations are sustainable but only 
one type of contract will emerge.  Borrowers of all productivity types will self-select into 
the individual liability contract only.  As discussed in the previous section, borrower 
incentives to default and to free ride on their peers increase in larger groups.  In larger 
groups, high productivity borrowers choose individual liability contracts, because of the 
increased costs of insuring peers.  The bank operations are sustainable, since the interest 
rate was set to make the individual liability contracts sustainable, if offered separately. 
  Suppose that there are two banks.  One of the banks offers an individual liability 
contract and the other bank offers a joint liability contract.  Each bank sets the interest 
rate so that its bank operations are sustainable, ignoring the presence of the other bank.  A 
problem appears when the two banks compete for clients.  Borrowers of different 
productivity types self-select into one of the two contracts and thus alter the pool of 
borrowers that the bank would face if the other bank did not exist (Navajas, Conning, and 
Gonzalez-Vega).  Therefore, banks that are in competition with each other for clients 
need to set their interest rates taking into consideration how the borrowers will be 
distributed between the two banks. 
 
Dynamic Model Results 
The dynamic model developed in this paper makes a realistic assumption that the value of 
future access to credit is endogenous (Rodriguez-Meza).  Borrowers have the option of 
defaulting and keeping their project returns but losing the value of being able to re-access  
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the market for future credit.  This value of future credit is found from the optimization 
problem to be an increasing function of the borrower’s productivity type.  In the static 
model, the value of future credit was assumed to be constant.  Even though the parameter 
values in the static and the dynamic models are the same, the results are different.  This is 
due to the assumption concerning the value of future credit and the time when the 
decisions to default are made (before or after the realization of the success or failure 
states). 
 
Individual liability contracts 
In a dynamic setting, the interest rate required for bank sustainability in individual 
lending is 67 percent and the number of borrowers is 98 percent of the population (table 
4).  The results in the dynamic model are somewhat similar to the results in the static 
model; however, a direct comparison is not possible, since this would require testing for 
the underlying assumptions of the models rather than comparing the results. 
  Agents with low productivity do not take loans and enjoy their reservation utility.  
Agents with medium productivity take loans and exert low effort.  Agents with high 
productivity take loans and exert high effort.  In the dynamic model, the borrowers’ 
decisions are state contingent.  If a borrower’s project is observed to be successful, the 
borrower does not strategically default and repays his loan.  If a borrower’s project fails, 
the borrower defaults because of inability but not of unwillingness to repay his loan.  
These results represent a dynamic version of the static model results where borrowers do 
not strategically default. 
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Joint liability contracts 
In a dynamic setting, the interest rate required for bank sustainability in group lending is 
37 percent for borrowers with independent returns and 55 percent for borrowers with 
correlated returns (table 4).  The interest rates in group lending are lower than the interest 
rates in individual lending because the bank can diversify risk across borrowers. 
  Given the values of the parameters, the number of borrowers is 100 percent of the 
population for group lending (table 4).  This result simply implies that if a bank opens 
operations in a new town or a village, everyone will form groups and take loans.  This 
result, however, does not imply that 100 percent of the borrowers will repay and remain 
borrowers in the future. 
  In a static setting, a low productivity borrower chooses not to take a loan and 
enjoys his reservation utility.  In the dynamic model, however, a low productivity 
borrower will take the loan and invest it into a project while exerting low effort and 
enjoying leisure benefits.  After the realization of his project, he will have the following 
state contingent strategy: repay, if both his and his partner’s projects are successful, and 
strategically default, if he is successful but his partner is not.  From the optimization 
problem, it is determined that when a borrower is of low productivity type, he does not 
value his future access to credit as much as a high productivity borrower.  The benefit of 
being insured against default in order to secure future access to credit less the cost of 
insuring his partner becomes less than his reservation utility, when he needs to repay two 
shares, and he then defaults. 
  The dynamic model, unlike the static model, can explain more reasonably the 
borrowers’ behavior regarding strategic default.  In the static model, strategic default is a  
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predetermined decision to always or never default under all circumstances.  The dynamic 
model has a potential to explain that, when a borrower is burdened with default by 
several of his partners, he might choose to default even though he would have repaid if 
fewer partners defaulted.  Therefore, the dynamic model can explain a situation where 
strategic default occurs in groups when adverse shocks affect several members.  The bank 
will be able to continue operations on a sustainable basis even in this case, since it has 
already taken this effect into account when setting interest rates. 
  The results for the medium and high productivity borrowers are the same as in 
individual lending.  Medium and high productivity borrowers take loans and exert low 
and high effort, respectively.  They do not strategically default, because their value of 
future access to credit is higher than their reservation utility, even if they have to repay 
for defaulting partners.  Overall, the results in the static and the dynamic models are 
similar, except for the case of low productivity borrowers in group lending. 
 
Conclusions 
The analysis developed in this paper is an example of how a bank may determine interest 
rates based on information about peer monitoring costs and social sanctions, correlation 
of business activities, investment opportunities, productivity and diligence characteristics 
of borrowers.  Following Armendariz de Aghion, we extend Navajas’ static model for 
individual lending with adverse selection and moral hazard to account for correlated 
returns and strategic default in group lending.  We develop a dynamic model that allows 
for default decisions to be made conditional on borrowers’ project outcomes.  
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  We find that, in a static framework, interest rates, default rates, and breadth and 
depth of outreach are lower in group lending than in individual lending.  These results 
hold as long as joint liability does not destroy borrowers’ incentives and does not lead to 
moral hazard and strategic default.  Enforcement of repayment in group lending crucially 
depends on peer monitoring and social sanctions; otherwise, borrowers strategically 
default and bank operations are not sustainable at any interest rate.  The lower interest 
rates charged in group lending do not necessarily make the joint liability contracts more 
attractive, since borrowers also incur the cost of monitoring and insuring their peers 
against default, while gaining the benefit of being insured against default.  In fact, some 
low productivity borrowers may become worse off under group lending and choose to 
drop out of the loan market altogether.  If low productivity is a signal of poverty, breadth 
as well as depth of outreach decreases.  When project returns are independent 
(correlated), group lending with group size of up to three people (eight people) is 
preferred by high productivity borrowers, as the benefit of being insured outweighs the 
cost of insuring peers; otherwise, if group size is larger, high productivity borrowers shift 
to individual liability contracts. 
  The results in the dynamic model indicate that state-contingent default decisions 
allow borrowers to choose when to default depending on how many other peers default.  
The dynamic model can better explain the real world situation where default occurs when 
adverse conditions affect several group members.  The bank can continue its operations 
even in this case if it has already accounted for that possibility when setting interest rates. 
  The findings in this paper have important policy implications for banks willing to 
extend financial services to poor producers without traditional collateral.  The  
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conventional wisdom that peer monitoring in group lending substitutes effectively for the 
lack of collateral may not always be valid.  High repayment rates are ensured only when 
borrowers can impose severe social sanctions on defaulting peers, when the transaction 
costs of monitoring are low (the probability of monitoring is high), and when groups are 
not too large. 
  As more banks offer different types of contracts in the same town or village, it is 
important to understand how potential borrowers will self-select into individual or group 
loans.  Failure to account for the presence of other banks may adversely change the 
riskiness of the pool of borrowers and threaten bank sustainability. 
  Group lending is usually implemented in an effort to alleviate poverty by serving 
a large number of poor people (breadth of outreach) and especially the poorest of the 
poor (depth of outreach).  Yet, the version of the widely used static model explored here 
predicts the opposite effect – that outreach in group lending is lower than outreach in 
individual lending.  The dynamic model developed in this paper predicts, instead, that 
outreach in group lending is higher than in individual lending.  Banks that want to extend 
their outreach to poor producers in developing countries and still remain financially 
sustainable will have to take into account the issues explored in this paper.  
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Table 1.  Microlending Parameters 
Variables Parameter Values in the 
Static Model 
Values in the 
Dynamic Model 
Loan size  I  100 100 
Interest rate  r=R-1  endogenous endogenous 
Joint liability component  c  0 or 1  0 or 1 
Group size   n  1, 2, 3,…  1 or 2 
Value of re-accessing market 
   for future credit 
V  300 endogenous 
Productivity type  z  [0,1] [0,1] 
Production constant  f  300 300 
Reservation utility  Y  -100  -100 
Leisure Benefits   B  1 1 
Probability of success if high effort  P
H  0.9 0.9 
Probability of success if low effort  P
L  0.6 0.6 
Probability of success and success if 
   high effort and high effort  
P
HH  0.97 0.97 
Probability of success and success if 
   low effort and low effort  
P
LL  0.89 0.89 
Social sanctions  W  200 or 100  200 or 100 
Probability of monitoring  γ   0.9 0.9 
Population  b  100 100 
Total handling costs for the bank  m  500 500 
Bank’s outside funding interest rate  ρ   0.1 0.1 
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Joint Liability Contracts 






61%  37%   54% 
Borrowers 
 
90%  80%   87% 
Default rate 
 
28%  15%   25% 
Productivity type 
and decision 
0-0.10  U 
0.11-0.65  LN 
0.66-1  HN 
 0-0.20    U 
0.21-0.34  LN 
0.35-1  HN 
 0-0.13    U 
0.14-0.56  LN 
0.57-1  HN 
U – non-applicant, L – low effort, H – high effort, N – not default, D – default. 
 
 
Table 3.  Sensitivity Analysis on Group Size 















2 37%  80%  U LN HN  54% 87%  U LN HN 
3 30%  73%  U HN  48% 84%  U LN HN 
4 31%  69%  U HN  42% 81%  U LN HN 
5 31%  64%  U HN  36% 79%  U LN HN 
6 32%  59%  U HN  32% 76%  U LN HN 
7 -  -  U HD  30% 74%  U HN 
8 -  -  U HD  30% 73%  U HN 
9 -  -  U HD  30% 72%  U HN 
10 -  -  U HD  31% 70%  U HN 
11 -  -  U HD  - -  U HD 
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U – non-applicant, L – low effort, H – high effort, N – not default, D – default, s – success, f – 
failure. The first index represents the choice for the first person, the second index represents the 
choice for the second person. 
 